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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3309 
___________ 
 
SUPRAMANIYAM SATHEESKUMAR, 
 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-230-099) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2014 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GARTH and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 04, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Supramaniyam Satheeskumar, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, attempted 
to enter the United States on November 20, 2010.  After a credible fear interview, the 
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Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued him a Notice to Appear charging him 
as removable under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) [8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)].  On January 3, 2011, Satheeskumar submitted an 
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
against Torture (“CAT”).  In support of his application, Satheeskumar claimed that he is 
eligible for relief because the Sri Lankan army believes that he supported the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), a separatist group.  Specifically, he alleged that the Sri 
Lankan army had beaten his brother and killed his uncle in the early 1990s, if not earlier.  
After those events, but before 1993, Satheeskumar dug bunkers for the LTTE.  In April 
2009, the Sri Lankan army forced him to stay in an internment camp, where he was 
beaten.  He was able to escape the camp in February 2010 by paying a bribe.   
 An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him removable, denied his applications for 
asylum and withholding of removal based on, inter alia, an adverse credibility 
determination, and concluded that he was not eligible for CAT protection.  On September 
15, 2011, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) dismissed 
Satheeskumar’s appeal, concluding that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not 
clearly erroneous.
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 The Board further held that the IJ “correctly concluded that, even if [Satheeskumar’s] 
testimony were deemed credible, his digging of bunkers for the LTTE constitutes 
material support for a terrorist organization and, as such, renders him statutorily ineligible 
for asylum or withholding of removal under the [INA].”  See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) 
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)].  We need not consider whether the material support 
statute bars Satheeskumar’s asylum and withholding claims because, as explained below, 
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 In October 2011, Satheeskumar filed a petition for review of the BIA’s September 
15, 2011 order.  At the same time, he filed a motion for relief with the BIA premised on 
changed circumstances in Sri Lanka.  After full briefing of his petition before us, the BIA 
granted his motion to reopen and remanded the record to the IJ for further proceedings 
related to Satheeskumar’s request for relief under the CAT.  The Government then filed a 
motion to dismiss Satheeskumar’s petition for review, and Satheeskumar filed a motion 
to hold his case in abeyance.  We determined that the reopening of Satheeskumar’s 
proceedings rendered the removal order non-final and granted the Government’s motion 
to dismiss.  See Satheeskumar v. Att’y Gen., 480 F. App’x 121, 123-24 (3d Cir. May 15, 
2012).  We specifically noted that our decision “in no way precludes Satheeskumar from 
seeking judicial review of the BIA’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal once 
the agency has fully adjudicated his CAT application and entered a final order.”  Id. at 
123.   
 On July 17, 2012, the IJ granted Satheeskumar CAT protection, holding that he 
“presented sufficient evidence to establish that he would ‘more likely than not’ personally 
be at risk of torture if he were removed to Sri Lanka” as a “returning Tamil asylum 
seeker.”  See Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that, 
after implementation of the CAT, it became “the policy of the United States not to expel 
. . . or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there 
                                                                                                                                                  
the adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
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are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture. . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), Pub.L. No. 105–277, div. G., tit. XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-
822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note))); see also Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 471 n.5 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“Deferral of removal [under the CAT] does not confer permanent 
immigration status on an alien, and an alien who has been granted this form of relief may 
be removed to another country where there is no likelihood of torture.” (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.17(b)(2))).  The DHS did not appeal that decision to the BIA.  Satheeskumar filed 
the instant petition for review on August 17, 2012.   
 We have jurisdiction under INA § 242.
2
  Because the BIA adopted the findings of 
the IJ and also commented on the sufficiency of the IJ’s determinations, we review the 
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 Because Satheeskumar filed his petition for review more than 30 days after entry of the 
BIA’s September 15, 2011 order denying asylum and withholding of removal, our Clerk 
directed the parties to respond to the question of jurisdiction.  INA § 242(b)(1) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(1)] (providing that a petition for review must be filed within 30 days of entry 
of a challenged order).  In response, both parties contend that we have jurisdiction.  As 
noted above, the September 15, 2011 order was rendered non-final when the BIA granted 
Satheeskumar’s motion to reopen.  See Bronisz v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 
2004) (stating that “the grant of a motion to reopen vacates the previous order of 
deportation or removal and reinstates the previously terminated immigration 
proceedings.”).  This is true even though the proceedings were reopened with respect to 
only a subset of Satheeskumar’s original claims.  See Lopez-Ruiz v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 
886, 887 (9th Cir. 2002).  After the BIA remanded proceedings to the IJ, the IJ 
determined that Satheeskumar qualified for CAT relief.  This grant of protection under 
the CAT on July 17, 2012, constituted the “order of removal” because it required the IJ to 
determine that Satheeskumar is, in fact, removable.  See Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 
103-05 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  That order became final on August 16, 2012, upon 
expiration of the 30-day appeal period.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.38-.39.  Accordingly, 
Satheeskumar’s petition for review, filed on August 17, 2012, was timely, and allows us 
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decisions of both the BIA and the IJ.  Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Our review of these decisions is for substantial evidence, considering whether 
they are “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
banc) (internal citation omitted).  We will uphold an adverse credibility determination 
under the substantial evidence standard “‘unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal citation omitted).   Because Satheeskumar filed his applications for relief 
after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods 
upon which the adverse credibility finding is based need not go to the heart of his claim.  
Id. at 119 n.5.  Rather, the REAL ID Act permits credibility determinations to be based 
on observations of Satheeskumar’s demeanor, the plausibility of his story, and the 
consistency of his statements.  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)]; 
Gabuniya v. Att’y. Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 322 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 We conclude that the adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial 
evidence.  The IJ identified four omissions and inconsistencies, “the cumulative effect of 
[which] rendered [Satheeskumar’s] testimony not credible”:  (1) Satheeskumar testified 
                                                                                                                                                  
to review the denial of asylum and withholding of removal.  See Lopez-Ruiz, 298 F.3d at 
887 (stating that petitioners are able to appeal an eventual “final removal decision on any 
ground which [they] have raised before the BIA before the final order of removal, not just 
the one that caused reopening.”). 
 
 
6 
 
on cross examination that the Sri Lankan army destroyed his hardware store in 1996, but 
did not mention that incident in his written asylum application or during his direct 
testimony; (2) he testified that the army shot and killed his cousin in 1988, but failed to 
include that allegation in his written application; (3) he stated in his written application 
that he was beaten in the internment camp on “three different occasions,” but testified 
that he was assaulted two times; and (4) he claimed in his asylum application that he 
helped the LTTE by digging bunkers “for nearly one year,” but testified that he dug 
bunkers only “three times.”   
 Although Satheeskumar has challenged each of these discrepancies/omissions, his 
responses to the first three of them are unavailing.
3
  In particular, he attempts to 
characterize as “trivial” the destruction of his hardware store, the death of his cousin, and 
the beatings while in the internment camp.  The details of those incidents, however, are 
central to Satheeskumar’s underlying claim that he fears persecution by the Sri Lankan 
army.  In this connection, we reject Satheeskumar’s suggestion that we should ignore 
these inconsistencies because his asylum claim is based solely on his “escape[] from the 
camp in 2009.”  In sum, the inconsistencies indentified by the IJ clearly undermined 
Satheeskumar’s credibility and, based on the record before us, we cannot find that “any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled” to reach a contrary conclusion than that 
reached by the IJ and BIA in this case.  Gabuniya, 463 F.3d at 321. 
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 Satheeskumar’s explanation regarding the extent of his work digging bunkers -- namely, 
that the three occasions on which he dug bunkers collectively took place over the course 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
                                                                                                                                                  
of a year – seemingly reconciles that discrepancy. 
